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O
n Dec. 22, 2005, President Bush signed legislation
renewing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA), which otherwise would have expired Dec.
31. TRIA was enacted, as a temporary measure, in response
to the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. It was intended to ensure
the availability of insurance covering businesses’ losses
resulting from any future terrorist attack. The renewal lasts
until 2007.
Following the Sept. 11 attacks, the price of terrorism 
coverage rose. The media carried stories of lenders withdraw-
ing support from commercial construction projects because
of these projects’ inability to acquire terrorism coverage at a
feasible price. Observers were fearful of possible macroeco-
nomic effects if construction declined, especially in a then
recession-weakened business environment.
TRIA promised that the federal government would 
reimburse property and casualty insurance companies for
most of the claims they paid, above a specified amount, due to
any future terrorist attack. It also required all commercial
property and casualty insurers to offer terrorism coverage to 
their customers.
According to the text of the law, its purpose is to “ensure
the continued widespread availability and affordability of
property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk; and allow
for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize
…and build capacity to absorb any future losses…” By these
measures, the law appears to have been successful. According
to a recent study by the Department of Treasury, the number
of businesses with terrorism coverage increased, and prices
declined, after TRIAwas implemented.
The federal government provides reimbursement to firms
if the following two conditions are met: First, the terrorist
attack must produce at least, in aggregate, $50 million in
2006 and $100 million in 2007 in insured losses. Second,
before the Treasury provides any reimbursement the insurer
must have met a deductible which it pays out of its own funds.
Once the deductible is met the Treasury reimburses the
insurer for 90 percent in 2006 and 85 percent in 2007 of its
terrorist claims. The percentage deductible increased from 
1 percent of all premiums collected by an insurance company,
immediately following the law’s enactment to 17.5 percent in
the program’s fourth year, 2006, and 20 percent in 2007.
At base, TRIAprovides public backing for the liabilities of
private insurance companies, helping insurers to meet their
obligations to their policyholders. Such government backing
is not unusual. For example, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act of 1933 established the FDIC to back deposits held in
banks. What is unusual about TRIAis that it offers this back-
ing free of charge, unlike the FDIC which charges premiums.
Since there are no charges associated with TRIA protec-
tion, the program provides a subsidy to insurers — and if the
commercial insurance market is competitive, to policyholders
as well. When the government provides a subsidy, economists
worry that too much of the subsidized good will be produced.
Given the subsidy of terrorism insurance, companies may
take less account of the danger of terrorist attack than they
should when making important business decisions. Too many
buildings may be built in risky locations, and too little effort
may be devoted to building structures that would withstand
an attack, or to investing in security efforts. When all such
decisions are combined, the final effect could be greater
exposure to losses due to terrorist attack than would be the
case without the subsidy. 
The government could limit these distortions by charging
risk-adjusted premiums for the insurance coverage it pro-
vides. (It’s worth noting that this would not solve the problem
entirely. Even if it were priced, government-provided terror-
ism insurance would likely produce some market distortions.)
The FDIC, for instance, charges higher premiums to banks
judged more likely to fail. By doing so, the subsidy is reduced.
Why does TRIA not include a provision for risk-adjusted
premiums? While the legislative history of the law is unclear
on this point, there are several possible reasons. For instance,
determining the risk could be quite difficult — perhaps more
difficult than determining the risk of bank failure. How much
more subject to terrorist attack is a building in New York than
one in Atlanta, or in Peoria? No one knows the answer 
for sure, but a risk-adjusted premium must account for 
such differences.
Still, most analysts think that terrorist attacks are more
likely to take place in large cities than in small ones. This has
important implications. Economists have argued that there
exist large economic benefits to bringing workers together in
a concentrated area. But given that terrorist attacks are more
likely in large cities, people have reason to avoid these loca-
tions. This could impose significant social costs. If TRIA
makes locating in large cities more desirable, some of those
costs could be offset.
On balance, then, the effects of the federal terrorism
insurance program are unclear. It almost surely has distorted
some firms’ decisionmaking about construction and security.
At the same time, it may have kept some firms from fleeing
major metropolitan areas, despite the advantages of being 
in those cities. A fuller examination of its costs and 
benefits awaits.  RF
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